I was taking a look at the Naomi Wu situation (A Chinese DIY tech youtuber who went missing after being watched by the government) and in one part they mentioned that she was concerned about her privacy, so started using Signal, but had a default chinese keyboard that had a keylogger and the police had looked into what she was talking on there.
I’m not sure if it was a mobile only thing, but it was mentioned that the keyboard app was used in like 70% por chinese smarthphones.
Now, I use AnySoftKey and refuse to use default keyboard apps, but how far can we reach on the keyboard security thing? Is typing on a computer or using a physical keyboard on a mobile device 100% safe? I think the keyboard issue is often overlooked and would like to know what recommendations your have? Or what should be known more?
On a standard computer, be it a desktop or laptop, it’s very hard to effectively avoid keylogging.
I don’t say you 100% have a keylogger on your PC, that’s not my point.
My point is that both on Windows, and on Linux systems that use the X11 window system instead of Wayland, any program can log your let presses with basically no effort.
On windows this is somewhat restricted when a program opens a secure desktop (a temporary “desktop”, usually (always?) with a single window). This happens when you have to grant admin rights to a program, but other programs can request such a thing too, like the keepass password manager can be set to prompt for the password on a secure desktop. I don’t know if the X11 window system of Linux has a similar feature.
But, as the other commenter said too, it depends on your threat model, because it can go a lot deeper than your choice of keyboard app.
If you use the original system of your smartphone, the manufacturer may have hidden software in it that can log your key presses even without cooperation if your keyboard app.
But if the modem - which is basically a different operating system that runs in parralel to the main one, but with the purpose of handling the connection with the cellular network, besides doing quite a few other things too - could get compromised, often it could be used to have open access to all the hardware that your main, android operating system uses. How is this on topic? This way intruders could observe where do you touch the touch screen, among a lot of other things.
This is exactly why Wayland replacing X11 is a good thing. X11 was developed in an academic, on-prem LAN environment where such security wasn’t a big consideration in its architectural design and needs to be allowed to gracefully retire from mainline use.
I really don’t see why you couldn’t attack wayland if you’re running code locally. Wayland is going to need keyboard hooks anyway to enable important productivity tools like anykey and clipboard managers.
Absolutely. With local and physical access, attacks are very doable. Starting with a security-conscious architecture means that it’s easier to improve over time.
ETA: The main point is that tech and use cases have evolved. This means that architecture of existing components needs to be re-evaluated for whether they are still a good way of accomplishing a task. In the case of X.org/X11, the architecture is more challenging to secure due to fundamental design. Wayland may not have full parity for remote use yet but, currently, security is generally a higher priority, so, its newer architecture that DOES consider security and sandboxing gives a better starting point in that area.
I fully anticipate that Wayland will also be replaced in the future as tech and use evolves further (does it consider AR/XR? Man-Machine-Interfaces that might see adoption? etc.). Like biology, it’s the nature of tech to evolve and, since there isn’t a sign that bad actors will be absent in the future, Wayland’s architecture will likely end up being insufficient to secure against input logging attacks of the future.
This is a /c/Privacy thread about mobile keyboards, my guy.
No, this thread is a general one, and I have mentioned Wayland. And they responded to me.
The post may be more about mobile keyboards, but OP has also asked about what’s the case with computers, besides phones
On Wayland, they probably still can. Wayland’s core protocol doesn’t allow it, but extensions to enable things like global hotkeys can almost certainly be used for shenanigans.
Also, if the keylogger is running under your user account, it can insert crafted
.desktopfiles wrapping around your apps,ptraceyour apps, you name it. Sandboxing as in Flatpak can stop this sort of thing, but if you run an app outside such a sandbox, and it’s malicious, game over.But does it work without prompting the user?
Also, I’m not too familiar with how it works, but afaik global hotkeys on KDE are implemented by the display server/compositor/whatever it’s called itself, and not sourced out to a different program.
Well, that’s an interesting point, I haven’t thought about that.
Right, but they’re configured by an unprivileged program: the settings app. Presumably, a keylogger can pretend to be the settings app.
Couldn’t the display server check if the app is actually the settings app by looking at it’s executable’s location? Not sure how reliable that is, but if it is, it could check if it is coming from somewhere in
/usrthat is also not writable by the current user.The display server has no way of verifying the process ID on the other end of the Unix-domain socket connection, and therefore cannot verify the executable image. It also cannot verify that the settings app hasn’t had any malicious code injected with
ptrace,LD_PRELOAD, or the like, since the injected code can remove any traces of that before connecting to the display server.