So, I was told to not use Signal, so all that is left is Matrix. And I am not techy enough to have my own server and neither are my relatives, so Matrix.org is the only option

  • mox@lemmy.sdf.org
    41·
    3 hours ago

    even with E2EE, the admins of a homeserver can still impersonate you

    No, they cannot. Your homeserver admin could create an impostor login session on your account, but it would be pointless with E2EE, because it would be flagged with an obviously visible warning. You and all of your contacts would see that the impostor session was not verified as you (this typically shows up as a bright red icon on the impostor and another one on the room they’re in) and the impostor would be unable to read your communications.

    • refalo@programming.dev
      1·
      3 hours ago

      What do you have to say about this then?

      In an encrypted room even with fully verified members, a compromised or hostile home server can still take over the room by impersonating an admin. That admin (or even a newly minted user) can then send events or listen on the conversations.

      Perhaps we have a different definition of “impersonate”… not everyone will pay attention to unverified warnings, and afaik they can still communicate with people (just maybe not read old messages)… but I would love to be proven wrong.

      • mox@lemmy.sdf.org
        11·
        1 hour ago

        a compromised or hostile home server can still take over the room

        A compromised server could affect a denial of service attack against its users, of course. The attacker could do the same thing by simply turning off the server. That’s true on all platforms that use servers. A reasonable response would be to switch to a different server.

        That admin (or even a newly minted user) can then send events

        Exactly what events do you think would be dangerous?

        or listen on the conversations.

        No. End-to-end encryption ensures that only the intended endpoints can read the messages. Older Matrix clients have a setting to block the user from sending messages to unverified devices/sessions, in case they somehow don’t understand the meaning of a bright red warning icon. I think newer ones (e.g. Element X) enforce that mode; if you’re concerned about this, you could check for yourself, but…

        not everyone will pay attention to unverified warnings

        …unfortunately, there are no guarantees when trying to fix human behavior. If you need a messaging app to make it hard for your contacts to do something obviously foolish, then I suggest waiting until Matrix 2.0 is officially released and implemented in the clients. The beta versions of Element X, for example, look like everything is locked down to avoid human mistakes like the one you’re describing.

        • refalo@programming.dev
          1·
          33 minutes ago

          End-to-end encryption ensures that only the intended endpoints can read the messages

          But who/what gets to decide who the intended recipients are? Can’t the homeserver admin just join the channel and then the other members would exchange keys automatically and now they can see what people say?

          • mox@lemmy.sdf.org
            11·
            7 minutes ago

            But who/what gets to decide who the intended recipients are?

            The sender, of course.

            Can’t the homeserver admin just join the channel and then the other members would exchange keys automatically and now they can see what people say?

            No. Verification prevents that.

            • refalo@programming.dev
              1·
              5 minutes ago

              I don’t understand. How would the sender prevent messages from going to the admin user that joined the room? It sounds like you’re implying new users simply can’t join a room? That makes no sense to me… I’ve certainly never experienced that. I see new users join encrypted rooms all the time and they can talk just fine… so what’s the deal? And isn’t verification off by default?