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Systemd-init has a larger attack surface compared to runit, openrc, or sysVinit.
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Systemd-logind relies on systemd, so we need to adapt it for non-systemD distributions to ensure compatibility with certain applications like GNOME.
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Udev also depends on systemd.
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SystemD is specific to Linux, which makes porting software to *BSD even more challenging. It’s uncertain what the future holds, and there may be circumstances where Linux becomes unusable for you (e.g., compatibility issues with your laptop). Having a good alternative that doesn’t require relearning everything is generally beneficial.
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SystemD-based distributions often come with more than just “systemd-init.” They include additional components like logind, resolved, networkd, systemd-timers, etc. However, many people still prefer using the alternatives they were accustomed to before systemd became popular, such as dhcpcd and cron. Consequently, having both sets of tools installed can increase the attack surface.
If a bug that was fixed over 7 years ago is your best example of security failure in systemd I think that’s proof enough that it’s safe.
Compare it to vulnerabilities found in SysVinit, which was as common as systemd-init is now. There were no similar bugs, that would allow crashing an entire system just by executing a single command.
There might not have been those kinds of bugs in sysvinit itself but the shitty quality init scripts it encouraged people to write certainly had thousands of security issues.
Misconfiguration is possible in any software. It’s not specific to sysvinit or systemd-init. Selinux was created to solve this.