EM Eye investigates a cybersecurity attack where the attackers eavesdrop on the confidential video data of cameras by parsing the unintentional electromagnetic leakage signals from camera circuits. This happens on the physical/analog layer of camera systems and thus allows attackers to steal victim’s camera data even when perfect software protections (e.g., unbreakable passwords) are all in place. Exploiting the eavesdropped videos, attackers can spy on privacy-sensitive information such as people’s activities in an enclosed room recorded by the victim’s home security camera. […]

Paper.

  • Rascabin
    4·
    2 months ago

    So how can one protect themselves from this type of attack, or does responsibility lie on the vendors to keep up with security updates?

    • potatopotato@sh.itjust.works
      81·
      2 months ago

      It’s just a tempest attack. Firmware won’t fix anything but the attack is an extremely expensive nation state level operation that doesn’t scale.

      • tavu@sopuli.xyzOP
        91·
        2 months ago

        […] the attack is an extremely expensive nation state level operation that doesn’t scale.

        About $250 at most. Quoting the linked page:

        Below is a list of equipment we used for the experiments.

        • (1) Software Defined Ratio (SDR): Ettus USRP B210 USRP, ~$2100.
        • (2) Low Noise Amplifier (LNA): Foresight Intelligence FSTRFAMP06 LNA, ~$200.
        • (3) Directional Antenna: A common outdoor Log-periodic directional antenna (LPDA), ~$15.
        • (4) A laptop, of course.

        Note that the equipment can be replaced with cheaper counterparts. For example, USRP B210 can be replaced with RTL-SDR that costs ~$30.

        To reproduce the attack: our GitHub repository provides the codes and instructions for reproducing and understanding the attack. We have prepared a ready-to-use software tool that can produce real-time reconstructions of the eavesdropped videos with EM signal input from the USRP device.

        • potatopotato@sh.itjust.works
          2·
          2 months ago

          $250 per camera that you have to be within meters of best case. That doesn’t include the packaging cost to make this look innocuous so probably significantly more money if you wanted this to be stealthy and reliable. Add in the money for the distribution and “installation” of such devices.

          This doesn’t scale at all.

          • tavu@sopuli.xyzOP
            1·
            2 months ago

            Well within the budget of a private investigator or burglar or peeping-tom or abusive ex-partner.

            No need to scale; plenty of privacy/security incursions don’t require mass-surveillance.

            That said, I’d suggest that the attack does scale economically . Think war-driving but with one of these setups – cruising around in a van through a dense neighbourhood collecting short clips of cctv footage looking for something of interest.

            • potatopotato@sh.itjust.works
              1·
              2 months ago

              Yeah, I’d agree with that.

              The point I was making was for people who thought this was cellphone cameras and that it would somehow work even if the camera wasn’t actively running.

              As far as war driving with an sdr you’d probably occasionally find something interesting, but the vast majority would be cameras just pointed back out at the street. I think you’d mostly see stuff where if you wanted to spy it would make more sense to hide your own camera because it’s already public.

              All that said, I would lose my shit if Hollywood did something believable for once and used this for a heist movie.

    • jabathekek@sopuli.xyz
      3·
      2 months ago

      I would guess covering the camera and/or data cord with tinfoil. Even more unsure about wireless.