Sorry for taking too long to reply, the questions were good but I was too busy irl to sit down and answer them appropriately.
how was that a cause for soviet instability? i don’t get it. is there not other factors at play here too? ^^; /genq
The policy of exporting revolution goes as far back as the Brest-Litovsk treaty negotiation to withdraw from WW1, with Trotsky as commissar of foreign affairs leading the peace delegation by trying to stall all negotiations while agitating for revolutions in Central Europe. This belligerence (from a position of weakness) meant not only harsher terms being imposed on Russia but also justifications for the foreign powers to invest in the badly named “Russian Civil War”.
After that the brand of “foreign agitators” always came along breaking of diplomatic relations whenever leftist movements became relevant, like the Spartacist uprising in Germany, the Spanish Civil War, Vietnam and so many others, whether they participated or not. The Brazilian Communist Party, for instance, was temporarily banned under the justification of being “a foreign party”.
They also constantly had to be running the arms race, not because there was any actual Soviet interest in beating the US (their only significant “first” was the ICBM), but because every hiccup around the world could be the trigger for Nuclear War.
There are many other factors at play, of course. Left-Communism up to the 40s, WW2 and subsequent aggression from NATO. But opening too many battle fronts was a mistake, and Afghanistan is when the US wised up to that mistake.
The Afghan war was specifically propped up by the US as an entrapment against the USSR, with many in the US Department of “Defense” calling it the “Soviet Vietnam”.
okay, but what about cuba and the revolutions in africa? they seem to have succeeded without the USSR becoming unstable.
Cuba was only supported after the Bay of Pigs battle, and at that point the Revolution was already successful. They were supported economically rather than militarily for the most part, due to the US embargo, and Cuban-Soviet relations accidentally ended up in history books as “The Cuban Missile Crisis” any way. It wasn’t a mistake, but there were great risks involved.
I’m not well read on Africa, but I’m not aware of any revolution that was materially supported by the Soviets before their success either. Vietnam and Korea were costly, but those two countries already had their own strong and militant parties and armies.
or hell, help out the commie parties in other countries if they ask for help.
AFAIK they are not really opposed to that. I’ve seen CPC officers in some CPUSA events for instance. But it’s a hard dilemma to balance, both for the CPC (as a party on one hand but a state actor on another) and for the local parties (requiring support but also needing to build their own autonomous structure). Integrated as they are into the global economy and geopolitical landscape, they prefer to not be seen as “meddlers”. And local parties are often very sectarian against the CPC.
I won’t pretend to be in love with the CPC or that I would be unhappy with them giving material support to my personal favourite parties, but I would be very surprised. And in the end, I don’t think it would be that effective without a heavy dose of self-organising.
But at least they are not wavering in their support for Korea or Vietnam.
this is the same country whose people wanted the USSR to stay back in the late 80s/early 90s, but pizza hut man still decided to kill it anyway for the lols.
Killing the USSR was only possible due to very real stagnation in the living conditions, mostly caused by the liberalisation reforms, but partly also due to geopolitical realities.
Sorry for taking too long to reply, the questions were good but I was too busy irl to sit down and answer them appropriately.
The policy of exporting revolution goes as far back as the Brest-Litovsk treaty negotiation to withdraw from WW1, with Trotsky as commissar of foreign affairs leading the peace delegation by trying to stall all negotiations while agitating for revolutions in Central Europe. This belligerence (from a position of weakness) meant not only harsher terms being imposed on Russia but also justifications for the foreign powers to invest in the badly named “Russian Civil War”.
After that the brand of “foreign agitators” always came along breaking of diplomatic relations whenever leftist movements became relevant, like the Spartacist uprising in Germany, the Spanish Civil War, Vietnam and so many others, whether they participated or not. The Brazilian Communist Party, for instance, was temporarily banned under the justification of being “a foreign party”.
They also constantly had to be running the arms race, not because there was any actual Soviet interest in beating the US (their only significant “first” was the ICBM), but because every hiccup around the world could be the trigger for Nuclear War.
There are many other factors at play, of course. Left-Communism up to the 40s, WW2 and subsequent aggression from NATO. But opening too many battle fronts was a mistake, and Afghanistan is when the US wised up to that mistake.
The Afghan war was specifically propped up by the US as an entrapment against the USSR, with many in the US Department of “Defense” calling it the “Soviet Vietnam”.
Cuba was only supported after the Bay of Pigs battle, and at that point the Revolution was already successful. They were supported economically rather than militarily for the most part, due to the US embargo, and Cuban-Soviet relations accidentally ended up in history books as “The Cuban Missile Crisis” any way. It wasn’t a mistake, but there were great risks involved.
I’m not well read on Africa, but I’m not aware of any revolution that was materially supported by the Soviets before their success either. Vietnam and Korea were costly, but those two countries already had their own strong and militant parties and armies.
AFAIK they are not really opposed to that. I’ve seen CPC officers in some CPUSA events for instance. But it’s a hard dilemma to balance, both for the CPC (as a party on one hand but a state actor on another) and for the local parties (requiring support but also needing to build their own autonomous structure). Integrated as they are into the global economy and geopolitical landscape, they prefer to not be seen as “meddlers”. And local parties are often very sectarian against the CPC.
I won’t pretend to be in love with the CPC or that I would be unhappy with them giving material support to my personal favourite parties, but I would be very surprised. And in the end, I don’t think it would be that effective without a heavy dose of self-organising.
But at least they are not wavering in their support for Korea or Vietnam.
Killing the USSR was only possible due to very real stagnation in the living conditions, mostly caused by the liberalisation reforms, but partly also due to geopolitical realities.