Nulide / FindMyDevice · GitLab
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Find your Device with an SMS or online with the help of FMDServer. This applications goal is to track your device when it's lost and should be a...

Find your Device with an SMS or online with the help of FMDServer. This applications goal is to track your device when it’s lost and should be a…

  • lemonuri
    15·
    5 months ago

    Here is a thorough analysis of /os’s security and privacy.

    https://www.kuketz-blog.de/e-datenschutzfreundlich-bedeutet-nicht-zwangslaeufig-sicher-custom-roms-teil6/

    Tldnr: it’s alright but but grapheme, divestos or calyxos should be preferred if those are available on your device.

    Problematic seems the unique device id /e os generates and sends on every update and also security updates for the integrated webview browser have been severely out of date in the past.

    • thingsiplay@beehaw.org
      3·
      5 months ago

      Looks like a good and careful analysis. While I speak German, its a lot to take here, so cannot say much about the articles content (besides some of the concepts are way above my head and understanding).

      But the article/analysis doesn’t seem to support your claim “not very degoogled”? (Edit: I changed this phrase, it was wrongly phrased.)

      The /e/os ID you mentioned, has nothing to do with Google, as the update information is sent to /e/os servers I guess (which in itself is concerning, I’m not saying otherwise). I personally don’t see a need to switch to any of the other services (they pretty much also support microG and I can’t install them anyway I guess).

      • lemonuri
        2·
        5 months ago

        Ok, yeah, you’ve got a point I think. But one could argue if microg is enabled by default, at least some info might leak to google as their push servers are contacted and a device id is created (even if the data is anonymized to some extend.). (Depending on if these settings are enabled by default in microg which I am not sure of).

        Here’s some info from the divestOS faq (cmp.: https://divestos.org/pages/faq):

        "Anything important I should know about microG?¶

        The 'Google device registration' and 'Google SafetyNet' options WILL make microG connect to Google servers.
The 'Cloud Messaging' option WILL make microG maintain a persistent connection to Google servers.
The 'Cloud Messaging' option does NOT require a Google account.
The 'Google SafetyNet' option WILL download and execute proprietary obfuscated code from Google and is strongly NOT recommended.
While microG itself is open source, any apps talking to it will do so using the proprietary Google Play Services library."

        It goes on to provide some guidelines if you want to use microg:

        How should I configure microG?¶

        "Depending on the apps you want to use there are a few different ways you can use microG.

        Some apps don't need microG but check that they were installed via Play, in this case you only need microG Companion/FakeStore and to install the app via `Aurora Store` (via session installer) or `Obtainium`. This mechanism only works on 18.1+ currently, adb workaround still necessary on older versions.
Some apps will work with microG simply installed without any Google connections, in this case it is strongly recommended to revoke Network permission from the microG app.
Some apps need push notifications via Google, for them you must let microG maintain a persistent identifiable connection to Google. Enable 'Google device registration' and 'Cloud Messaging' in microG.
Some apps require a captcha to be performed by the user, for them you can enable the 'Google SafetyNet' option.
Some apps require SafetyNet to work, while the option to enable it currently exists it will not work in the unprivileged mode that DivestOS uses and will be removed in a future update."

        So depending on your thread model, you still would want to disable some of the options in microg to have absolutely no leakage of data to google. For example I am not comfortable any more with using push notifications since it was revealed that state actors use this info to tail users communications.