What do you think of the response?

  • Anna ☭🏳️‍⚧️@lemmygrad.ml
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    2 years ago

    In all honesty, I’m surprised that my essay managed to make it to Quora, but that’s besides the point.

    In case you don’t know, I’m the person who wrote the essay (Username is GopnikAward at Prolewiki). I’ve taken a look at the response and wrote a response towards it.

    Firstly, the person confuses GDP growth with GDP. I know I used a capitalist measurement, but there’s a reason I used GDP growth. Growth is used to indicate how well a nation is developing. It may be a capitalist measurement, and it may not be perfect (as GDP growth does not correlate with increase in living standards), but it is useful for that purpose. He also states that “the GDP doubled in those ten years”. From 1966 the measurement was 76.72 Billion, and in 1976 the measurement was 153.94. If we compare the value, it is definitely about twice the amount. However, if we compare 1980 to 1990, the GDP growth between the ten years is about 1.8 times. Not much of a difference as it is only a difference of 0.2. In terms of GDP growth, if we compare the GDP growth average between 1966 to 1976, we only get 6.5, in 1980-1990, we get 10.12, a much more substantial number.[1] This means that the market economy definitely worked out for China in terms of GDP growth.

    The productive forces falling backwards is not a myth. China fell behind the rest of the world, to the point where they were at least decades behind even the third world nations. Especially considering the time period, that globalisation was in force, many nations are being subject to imperialism, however, their productive forces were being developed (albeit under the imperialist domination). Also note that the Gang of Four was calling any intellectual ‘bourgeois’[2]. This hampered the progress in science, which was very much needed within China, hence why China fell behind the third world nations.

    The four modernizations we are striving to achieve are modernizations with Chinese characteristics. Our concept of the four modernizations is different from yours. By achieving the four modernizations, we mean achieving a comparative prosperity. Even if we realize the four modernizations by the end of this century, our per capita GNP will still be very low. If we want to reach the level of a relatively wealthy country of the Third World with a per capita GNP US $1,000 for example, we have to make an immense effort. Even if we reach that level, we will still be a backward nation compared to Western countries. [3]

    Next he states that the reason why China didn’t grow as much because it was blockaded by the US and the USSR. The USSR didn’t sanction China, it only stopped trading due to the Sino-Soviet split (which Mao started initially), and the US did have a blockade in China, however a trade embargo was released when Mao had relations with Richard Nixon.

    Next he contrasts apples to oranges when he said that the Market Socialist economy under Tito was a failure. It was. I don’t disagree one bit on that. Tito failed to apply the market socialist economy effectively, and Tito failed to analyse the material conditions properly, and turned towards revisionism. His economy made only some regions richer, which prospered economic nationalism amongst each ethnic group. Not only that, he decentralised both economic and political power which was a bad idea. If you want an idea of how Deng compares with other ‘market reforms’ please take a read at this.[4]

    Also yes, I quoted Deng Xiaoping, unapologetically at that. I don’t care. Also transforming the relations of production does not automatically mean that the productive forces can enhance further. Lenin shown this earlier, as he said it would be a step forward if we retained the old relations of production so that the productive forces can be enhanced:

    State capitalism would be a step forward as compared with the present state of affairs in our Soviet Republic. If in approximately six months’ time state capitalism became established in our Republic, this would be a great success and a sure guarantee that within a year socialism will have gained a permanently firm hold and will have become invincible in this country.[5]

    Tell me, if changing the relations of production would bring more towards the productive forces, why hasn’t Lenin or Deng done it? It’s because neither Soviet Russia or China were ready for it. Now some of you will say but they’re not the same!!!11. I know. There are differences, but both can be compared with each other. It’s not like apples and oranges like he did earlier.

    At least he acknowledges that ‘Dengism’ is not an ideology (which is true), but then he compares apples and oranges again, which he states that Trots do not call themselves Trots. Let’s look at a party in my country, the Socialist Party (Militant). They clearly praise themselves when they call themselves trotskyists.[6] No communist party ever calls themselves ‘Dengist’. Even communist parties which support China.

    So you got more than what you expected, and if you want a TL;DR, it’s bullshit.

    • SovereignState@lemmygrad.ml
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      2 years ago

      Every other leftkult out there loves the nom de idéologue naming convention. Trotskyists, Hoxhaists, Maoist-Gonzalo-Thoughtists, Luxemburgists, De Leonists… Very curious that Marxist-Leninists don’t tend to call ourselves “Stalinists”, “Dengists”, “Guevarists”, “Castroists”, “Brezhnevists”, “Sankarists” except ironically… it’s only our enemies who call us those things. Just interesting. Maybe because we are materialists who reject Great Manism and fanatical hero-worship as a concrete baseline for political philosophy? Of course, we do still call ourselves Marxist-Leninists. Great comment and awesome sourcing.

    • QueerCommie@lemmygrad.mlOP
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      2 years ago

      Kingsley’s response:

      In terms of GDP growth, if we compare the GDP growth average between 1966 to 1976, we only get 6.5, in 1980-1990, we get 10.12, a much more substantial number.[1] This means that the market economy definitely worked out for China in terms of GDP growth. I must admit that the instabilities in the Cultural Revolution did cause GDP reduction initially, hence the average GDP growth rate being relatively low. However, the political stability of 1969–76 allowed for promising economic growth (9.19% growth rate yearly, on average; not bad for a country with its conditions). The policies did not hinder growth, but facilitated it:

      After the commune system was established, the communes and brigades set up as many as 40,000 agricultural technological expansion and improvement stations with the help of the central government. A four-level research network (county, commune, brigade, and team) covered the breadth of rural areas, greatly raising the level of technology for agricultural production by improving seed strains, controlling plant diseases and the use of both organic and chemical fertilizers to improve soil conditions towards increased production. According to Thomas B. Wiens, an agricultural specialist, China’s work on hybridization in the early 1950s achieved great results in new dwarf rice varieties and hybrid maize. Wiens explained how the seed selecting system of this research network was able to achieve the period from breeding to full-scale production in the shortest time possible. This demonstrated the superiority of having a network structure under the commune over commercial for-profit seed companies to improve agricultural technology. https://foreignlanguages.press/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/N01-From-Victory-to-Defeat-7th-Printing.pdf

      The GDP growth that happened in this period only happened due to a rise in prices of goods; while the socialist system followed the law of lowering basic needs’ prices and raising luxuries’ prices, following market reforms, basic needs’ prices rose sharply, allowing “more value” to be created. Furthermore, it required ruthless exploitation of labor; the surplus product that workers made was surplus value belonging to capitalists, not product that was used to better workers’ lives; the high-value investments that boosed GDP growth did not bring so much benefit, either:

      The concrete example of the making of iPhones shows how the new international division of labor benefited Apple, an American high-tech multinational. Apple introduced its new product in 2007 and sold three million iPhones that year, 5.3 million the next and eleven million in 2009. … Worker wages in each assembled iPhone constituted only $6.50, a merely 3.6% of the total manufacturing costs. …

      Additionally, housing stock expanded rapidly, reaching a level far above people’s ability to buy, causing the fear of a housing bubble burst. From the government rescue package came the extensive construction of the transportation network, which included 30,000 kilometers (18,600 miles) of high-speed railway and 35,000 km (22,000 miles) of highways.57 The major infrastructure construction facilitated the flow of goods and people. At the same time, tremendous waste resulted from over-building. Many four-lane highways built in small towns are still deserted, while whole cities and towns with rows and rows of residential and commercial buildings, roads, hotels and exhibition centers stand empty. This overinvestment has represented an extreme imbalance in the Chinese economy and caused tremendous damage to China’s natural environment. https://foreignlanguages.press/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/N01-From-Victory-to-Defeat-7th-Printing.pdf

      The productive forces falling backwards is not a myth. China fell behind the rest of the world, to the point where they were at least decades behind even the third world nations. Even Chinese media from under Deng admitted that China’s productive forces were making rapid advances prior to the reforms:

      https://massline.org/PekingReview/PR1984/PR1984-35.pdf

      Obviously, economic development would take time under any system, but given the time it had, Mao’s policies showed pretty good results; with more time, they would have had better results.

      Also transforming the relations of production does not automatically mean that the productive forces can enhance further. I did not mean stepping very far forward in relations of production would allow productive forces to expand. Obviously, that would be ultra-“leftist”. That is why China had land reform before collectivization. However, the development from individual ownership of land to collective ownership developed agrarian productive forces. Similarly, calculated advances in productive relations develop productive forces, and that increase in wealth allows for further advances.

      Tell me, if changing the relations of production would bring more towards the productive forces, why hasn’t Lenin or Deng done it? It’s because neither Soviet Russia or China were ready for it. But the NEP lasted for only a few years; China has been doing what it does for over 40. Most growth in the USSR happened under Stalin, with its economy much like China’s under Mao. That shows that the NEP was a necessary step, but only a temporary one, not a long-term one. Similarly, China’s capitalist policies prior to 1956 were necessary but temporary.

      I apologize for the lateness of this reply; I was really unsure and a bit unconfident about how to respond for a while.