In terms of GDP growth, if we compare the GDP growth average between 1966 to 1976, we only get 6.5, in 1980-1990, we get 10.12, a much more substantial number.[1] This means that the market economy definitely worked out for China in terms of GDP growth.
I must admit that the instabilities in the Cultural Revolution did cause GDP reduction initially, hence the average GDP growth rate being relatively low. However, the political stability of 1969–76 allowed for promising economic growth (9.19% growth rate yearly, on average; not bad for a country with its conditions). The policies did not hinder growth, but facilitated it:
After the commune system was established, the communes and brigades set up as many as 40,000 agricultural technological expansion and improvement stations with the help of the central government. A four-level research network (county, commune, brigade, and team) covered the breadth of rural areas, greatly raising the level of technology for agricultural production by improving seed strains, controlling plant diseases and the use of both organic and chemical fertilizers to improve soil conditions towards increased production. According to Thomas B. Wiens, an agricultural specialist, China’s work on hybridization in the early 1950s achieved great results in new dwarf rice varieties and hybrid maize. Wiens explained how the seed selecting system of this research network was able to achieve the period from breeding to full-scale production in the shortest time possible. This demonstrated the superiority of having a network structure under the commune over commercial for-profit seed companies to improve agricultural technology.
https://foreignlanguages.press/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/N01-From-Victory-to-Defeat-7th-Printing.pdf
The GDP growth that happened in this period only happened due to a rise in prices of goods; while the socialist system followed the law of lowering basic needs’ prices and raising luxuries’ prices, following market reforms, basic needs’ prices rose sharply, allowing “more value” to be created. Furthermore, it required ruthless exploitation of labor; the surplus product that workers made was surplus value belonging to capitalists, not product that was used to better workers’ lives; the high-value investments that boosed GDP growth did not bring so much benefit, either:
The concrete example of the making of iPhones shows how the new international division of labor benefited Apple, an American high-tech multinational. Apple introduced its new product in 2007 and sold three million iPhones that year, 5.3 million the next and eleven million in 2009. … Worker wages in each assembled iPhone constituted only $6.50, a merely 3.6% of the total manufacturing costs. …
Additionally, housing stock expanded rapidly, reaching a level far above people’s ability to buy, causing the fear of a housing bubble burst. From the government rescue package came the extensive construction of the transportation network, which included 30,000 kilometers (18,600 miles) of high-speed railway and 35,000 km (22,000 miles) of highways.57 The major infrastructure construction facilitated the flow of goods and people. At the same time, tremendous waste resulted from over-building. Many four-lane highways built in small towns are still deserted, while whole cities and towns with rows and rows of residential and commercial buildings, roads, hotels and exhibition centers stand empty. This overinvestment has represented an extreme imbalance in the Chinese economy and caused tremendous damage to China’s natural environment.
https://foreignlanguages.press/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/N01-From-Victory-to-Defeat-7th-Printing.pdf
The productive forces falling backwards is not a myth. China fell behind the rest of the world, to the point where they were at least decades behind even the third world nations.
Even Chinese media from under Deng admitted that China’s productive forces were making rapid advances prior to the reforms:
Obviously, economic development would take time under any system, but given the time it had, Mao’s policies showed pretty good results; with more time, they would have had better results.
Also transforming the relations of production does not automatically mean that the productive forces can enhance further.
I did not mean stepping very far forward in relations of production would allow productive forces to expand. Obviously, that would be ultra-“leftist”. That is why China had land reform before collectivization. However, the development from individual ownership of land to collective ownership developed agrarian productive forces. Similarly, calculated advances in productive relations develop productive forces, and that increase in wealth allows for further advances.
Tell me, if changing the relations of production would bring more towards the productive forces, why hasn’t Lenin or Deng done it? It’s because neither Soviet Russia or China were ready for it.
But the NEP lasted for only a few years; China has been doing what it does for over 40. Most growth in the USSR happened under Stalin, with its economy much like China’s under Mao. That shows that the NEP was a necessary step, but only a temporary one, not a long-term one. Similarly, China’s capitalist policies prior to 1956 were necessary but temporary.
I apologize for the lateness of this reply; I was really unsure and a bit unconfident about how to respond for a while.
Kingsley’s response:
In terms of GDP growth, if we compare the GDP growth average between 1966 to 1976, we only get 6.5, in 1980-1990, we get 10.12, a much more substantial number.[1] This means that the market economy definitely worked out for China in terms of GDP growth. I must admit that the instabilities in the Cultural Revolution did cause GDP reduction initially, hence the average GDP growth rate being relatively low. However, the political stability of 1969–76 allowed for promising economic growth (9.19% growth rate yearly, on average; not bad for a country with its conditions). The policies did not hinder growth, but facilitated it:
After the commune system was established, the communes and brigades set up as many as 40,000 agricultural technological expansion and improvement stations with the help of the central government. A four-level research network (county, commune, brigade, and team) covered the breadth of rural areas, greatly raising the level of technology for agricultural production by improving seed strains, controlling plant diseases and the use of both organic and chemical fertilizers to improve soil conditions towards increased production. According to Thomas B. Wiens, an agricultural specialist, China’s work on hybridization in the early 1950s achieved great results in new dwarf rice varieties and hybrid maize. Wiens explained how the seed selecting system of this research network was able to achieve the period from breeding to full-scale production in the shortest time possible. This demonstrated the superiority of having a network structure under the commune over commercial for-profit seed companies to improve agricultural technology. https://foreignlanguages.press/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/N01-From-Victory-to-Defeat-7th-Printing.pdf
The GDP growth that happened in this period only happened due to a rise in prices of goods; while the socialist system followed the law of lowering basic needs’ prices and raising luxuries’ prices, following market reforms, basic needs’ prices rose sharply, allowing “more value” to be created. Furthermore, it required ruthless exploitation of labor; the surplus product that workers made was surplus value belonging to capitalists, not product that was used to better workers’ lives; the high-value investments that boosed GDP growth did not bring so much benefit, either:
The concrete example of the making of iPhones shows how the new international division of labor benefited Apple, an American high-tech multinational. Apple introduced its new product in 2007 and sold three million iPhones that year, 5.3 million the next and eleven million in 2009. … Worker wages in each assembled iPhone constituted only $6.50, a merely 3.6% of the total manufacturing costs. …
Additionally, housing stock expanded rapidly, reaching a level far above people’s ability to buy, causing the fear of a housing bubble burst. From the government rescue package came the extensive construction of the transportation network, which included 30,000 kilometers (18,600 miles) of high-speed railway and 35,000 km (22,000 miles) of highways.57 The major infrastructure construction facilitated the flow of goods and people. At the same time, tremendous waste resulted from over-building. Many four-lane highways built in small towns are still deserted, while whole cities and towns with rows and rows of residential and commercial buildings, roads, hotels and exhibition centers stand empty. This overinvestment has represented an extreme imbalance in the Chinese economy and caused tremendous damage to China’s natural environment. https://foreignlanguages.press/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/N01-From-Victory-to-Defeat-7th-Printing.pdf
The productive forces falling backwards is not a myth. China fell behind the rest of the world, to the point where they were at least decades behind even the third world nations. Even Chinese media from under Deng admitted that China’s productive forces were making rapid advances prior to the reforms:
https://massline.org/PekingReview/PR1984/PR1984-35.pdf
Obviously, economic development would take time under any system, but given the time it had, Mao’s policies showed pretty good results; with more time, they would have had better results.
Also transforming the relations of production does not automatically mean that the productive forces can enhance further. I did not mean stepping very far forward in relations of production would allow productive forces to expand. Obviously, that would be ultra-“leftist”. That is why China had land reform before collectivization. However, the development from individual ownership of land to collective ownership developed agrarian productive forces. Similarly, calculated advances in productive relations develop productive forces, and that increase in wealth allows for further advances.
Tell me, if changing the relations of production would bring more towards the productive forces, why hasn’t Lenin or Deng done it? It’s because neither Soviet Russia or China were ready for it. But the NEP lasted for only a few years; China has been doing what it does for over 40. Most growth in the USSR happened under Stalin, with its economy much like China’s under Mao. That shows that the NEP was a necessary step, but only a temporary one, not a long-term one. Similarly, China’s capitalist policies prior to 1956 were necessary but temporary.
I apologize for the lateness of this reply; I was really unsure and a bit unconfident about how to respond for a while.