The argument makes less sense outside of it’s context. Moore was responding to the skeptical position that we’re all in a simulation. Moore argues that this skeptical argument undermines itself: all of the language, terms and concepts which form the simulation argument are based on the sensory experience that the argument would effectively dismiss. Furthermore, any argument that we’re in a simulation is epistemologically on a par with the argument that we’re not. Therefore we should have less confidence in the skeptical argument than the common sense conclusion that we have hands.
The point about “are we in a simulation?” is not that we are (setting aside the whole technological singularity thing for the moment), but that we could be. The common sense thing only says that we’re more likely not, but does not at all say that we definitely are not. “Could be” still remains.
Moore’s point is that we shouldn’t let the inability to eliminate that “what if,” which was specifically designed to be non-disprovable, actually affect ontology. That problems and questions created by philosophers basically just to stump philosophical methods should be all but ignored since, by design, there clearly can’t be an answer except that one thing is by far most likely, and the other thing cannot matter because we can’t prove or act upon it or treat it as anything other than a manufactured source of doubt/skepticism.
It is still important to understand that the only thing which can be known about reality with complete certainty is:
There is isness. Reality exists.
We cannot know with certainty the nature of that reality. We can only know our perception, and even if we accept that we are perceiving reality (which is most likely, but not necessarily, true), our perceptions of that reality are incomplete and flawed. That’s a pretty important part of the nature of being.
I get rather irritated with those arguments because they only return to the start. “Here, a world”. “Is it how we experience it, though, and why and how; if not, what’s behind?”. “Bullshit, a world”. That’s hardly an answer. And, personally, it feels intellectually dishonest because the question was larger than just “is there a world?”.
I prefer an answer like saying that doubting the world in any form might be a mistake on its own because [reasons]. I do not agree, but at least there’s explanations and communication.
Also, I think they are fighting a straw man. For instance, I doubt many things about the Universe, our knowledge, our minds, etc. Yet, I accept there are phenomena which appear to me. This has been the case since the ancient school of skepticism, and I have yet to meet a person which declares themself a skeptic and does not do this to some degree. For example, I know I’m hungry right now. I don’t know if the pain is real in any other deeper level, or if it is like the pain in a dream that goes away when one wakes up, or a delusion that is felt without external stimuli, or whatever. I don’t know the nature of it, yet it is an experience I must attend. I can even add that the mechanisms behind, the anatomical knowledge and such is useful, but it might be entirely wrong or be as illusory as the pain itself. The straw man is that skeptics would say: “I don’t know if I’m really feeling hungry”, “I don’t know if I want to eat” or something like that.
Why does it matter, then? Because it changes everything. In my case, it made me go from a realist teenager to an instrumentalist adult in science. From an atheist teenager to an agnostic adult.
The discussion derives in many interesting branches too. The mere “does it matter if the world is different from what we perceive if we cannot perceive it in any other way?” is an example. Many people answer yes or no without justifying it. And, at this point, some people might be wondering why we need to justify every single belief we hold and every single thing we say, like the ones throughout my comment, and that in itself is a new good question that emerges. The possibility of having any of these conversations is also a good question, and so on…
So philosophy is not going too far, in my opinion. Some philosophers might go too far, but I really think they are rare (or misunderstood).
Reminds me of the G.E. Moore epistemological argument against universal skepticism:
Philosophy sometimes goes so far that an appeal to common sense is a breath of fresh air.
The conclusion in line three does not follow from the premises in lines one and two, because perception is not reality.
The correct argument against universal skepticism:
The argument makes less sense outside of it’s context. Moore was responding to the skeptical position that we’re all in a simulation. Moore argues that this skeptical argument undermines itself: all of the language, terms and concepts which form the simulation argument are based on the sensory experience that the argument would effectively dismiss. Furthermore, any argument that we’re in a simulation is epistemologically on a par with the argument that we’re not. Therefore we should have less confidence in the skeptical argument than the common sense conclusion that we have hands.
The point about “are we in a simulation?” is not that we are (setting aside the whole technological singularity thing for the moment), but that we could be. The common sense thing only says that we’re more likely not, but does not at all say that we definitely are not. “Could be” still remains.
Moore’s point is that we shouldn’t let the inability to eliminate that “what if,” which was specifically designed to be non-disprovable, actually affect ontology. That problems and questions created by philosophers basically just to stump philosophical methods should be all but ignored since, by design, there clearly can’t be an answer except that one thing is by far most likely, and the other thing cannot matter because we can’t prove or act upon it or treat it as anything other than a manufactured source of doubt/skepticism.
It is still important to understand that the only thing which can be known about reality with complete certainty is:
We cannot know with certainty the nature of that reality. We can only know our perception, and even if we accept that we are perceiving reality (which is most likely, but not necessarily, true), our perceptions of that reality are incomplete and flawed. That’s a pretty important part of the nature of being.
I get rather irritated with those arguments because they only return to the start. “Here, a world”. “Is it how we experience it, though, and why and how; if not, what’s behind?”. “Bullshit, a world”. That’s hardly an answer. And, personally, it feels intellectually dishonest because the question was larger than just “is there a world?”.
I prefer an answer like saying that doubting the world in any form might be a mistake on its own because [reasons]. I do not agree, but at least there’s explanations and communication.
Also, I think they are fighting a straw man. For instance, I doubt many things about the Universe, our knowledge, our minds, etc. Yet, I accept there are phenomena which appear to me. This has been the case since the ancient school of skepticism, and I have yet to meet a person which declares themself a skeptic and does not do this to some degree. For example, I know I’m hungry right now. I don’t know if the pain is real in any other deeper level, or if it is like the pain in a dream that goes away when one wakes up, or a delusion that is felt without external stimuli, or whatever. I don’t know the nature of it, yet it is an experience I must attend. I can even add that the mechanisms behind, the anatomical knowledge and such is useful, but it might be entirely wrong or be as illusory as the pain itself. The straw man is that skeptics would say: “I don’t know if I’m really feeling hungry”, “I don’t know if I want to eat” or something like that.
Why does it matter, then? Because it changes everything. In my case, it made me go from a realist teenager to an instrumentalist adult in science. From an atheist teenager to an agnostic adult.
The discussion derives in many interesting branches too. The mere “does it matter if the world is different from what we perceive if we cannot perceive it in any other way?” is an example. Many people answer yes or no without justifying it. And, at this point, some people might be wondering why we need to justify every single belief we hold and every single thing we say, like the ones throughout my comment, and that in itself is a new good question that emerges. The possibility of having any of these conversations is also a good question, and so on…
So philosophy is not going too far, in my opinion. Some philosophers might go too far, but I really think they are rare (or misunderstood).