If it has full memories of existing before it’s body was created then it is you? I would say think so.
No, because it’s a difference instance. From the copies perspective, it’s you and always was. From your perspective, you “go dark.” The copy thinks it’s “you”, as in the same, uninterrupted instance that you are. It just happens to be mistaken. It’s identical except for the fact that its a separate instance of you.
A perfect copy of me is just as much me as I am.
In a sense, I think that’s fair. It thinks its you, it feels like it always was you, and I think it’s fair to take some satisfaction that, if you could have that copy, at least to that copy if feels like it was always there.
A digital upload is just a less than perfect copy of a flesh substrate.
Wait, why? That may or may not be the case, but it would be due to reasons that have to due with complicated science about structural and chemical properties of those respective systems, and investigating whether the differences between them make a difference that matters.
I can do morse code on a sheet of paper or etch it into a stone tablet, and there’s a meaningful sense in which the code is still the same.
Wait, why? That may or may not be the case, but it would be due to reasons that have to due with complicated science about structural and chemical properties of those respective systems, and investigating whether the differences between them make a difference that matters.
I think it is reasonable that the chemicals, bacteria and viruses in our body have an affect on who we are and what we act like. A computer (excluding super advanced ones like the “modern” times Orion’s Arm universe would have) would have a different affect on you than what I mentioned previously.
While your code on the two elements are the same, one program compiled separately for two separate architectures would not be. The two binaries are less than perfect copies with ever so slight changes in how they behave.
On another note:
A perfect copy of me would act on my behalf and I the copy. I don’t think there would be any meaningful distinction between the two of me unless I was separated from the other instance for a long time and had wildly different environments. If one body dies I am still alive because of the other me.
The above would apply to less than perfect copies too until it reaches a threshold where I and the copy were not acting in each other’s behalf.
I think it is reasonable that the chemicals, bacteria and viruses in our body have an affect on who we are and what we act like.
I understand that, but as I said, that would be due to reasons that have to do with complicated science about structural and chemical properties of those respective systems, and investigating whether the differences between them make a difference that matters. Do clay tablets introduce copying errors you don’t have when you write down morse code on pen and paper? Do they need some assembly-level code in the beginning because they get input into a stone tablet reading machine? Do the totality of those changes change the meaning or essense of the message as it existed on pen and paper?
A computer is different from biology, of course, but it can in principle model the effects of biology, if we decide that we need those to fully represent a mind that we want to call equivalent to the “real” thing. So we wouldn’t just simulate a brain, but a brain as it would exist in a body with its environmental inputs. Unless a computer can’t model those? Which I would probably disagree with, but there is a fair argument to be had there. But the point is, I don’t think complexity of interacting environments gets you out of the space of things that can in principle be represented on a computer.
A perfect copy of me would act on my behalf and I the copy. I don’t think there would be any meaningful distinction between the two of me unless I was separated from the other instance for a long time and had wildly different environments.
It depends on what distinction you are trying to make, and what you are deciding is meant by “me.” Just at the level of plain language, they are clearly different from you in that they are a different instance of you experiencing an independent stream of consciousness. You wouldn’t necessary coordinate, you would see different things at different times. You would be “inside” one of them and not the other, etc.
No, because it’s a difference instance. From the copies perspective, it’s you and always was. From your perspective, you “go dark.” The copy thinks it’s “you”, as in the same, uninterrupted instance that you are. It just happens to be mistaken. It’s identical except for the fact that its a separate instance of you.
In a sense, I think that’s fair. It thinks its you, it feels like it always was you, and I think it’s fair to take some satisfaction that, if you could have that copy, at least to that copy if feels like it was always there.
Wait, why? That may or may not be the case, but it would be due to reasons that have to due with complicated science about structural and chemical properties of those respective systems, and investigating whether the differences between them make a difference that matters.
I can do morse code on a sheet of paper or etch it into a stone tablet, and there’s a meaningful sense in which the code is still the same.
I think it is reasonable that the chemicals, bacteria and viruses in our body have an affect on who we are and what we act like. A computer (excluding super advanced ones like the “modern” times Orion’s Arm universe would have) would have a different affect on you than what I mentioned previously. While your code on the two elements are the same, one program compiled separately for two separate architectures would not be. The two binaries are less than perfect copies with ever so slight changes in how they behave.
On another note: A perfect copy of me would act on my behalf and I the copy. I don’t think there would be any meaningful distinction between the two of me unless I was separated from the other instance for a long time and had wildly different environments. If one body dies I am still alive because of the other me. The above would apply to less than perfect copies too until it reaches a threshold where I and the copy were not acting in each other’s behalf.
I understand that, but as I said, that would be due to reasons that have to do with complicated science about structural and chemical properties of those respective systems, and investigating whether the differences between them make a difference that matters. Do clay tablets introduce copying errors you don’t have when you write down morse code on pen and paper? Do they need some assembly-level code in the beginning because they get input into a stone tablet reading machine? Do the totality of those changes change the meaning or essense of the message as it existed on pen and paper?
A computer is different from biology, of course, but it can in principle model the effects of biology, if we decide that we need those to fully represent a mind that we want to call equivalent to the “real” thing. So we wouldn’t just simulate a brain, but a brain as it would exist in a body with its environmental inputs. Unless a computer can’t model those? Which I would probably disagree with, but there is a fair argument to be had there. But the point is, I don’t think complexity of interacting environments gets you out of the space of things that can in principle be represented on a computer.
It depends on what distinction you are trying to make, and what you are deciding is meant by “me.” Just at the level of plain language, they are clearly different from you in that they are a different instance of you experiencing an independent stream of consciousness. You wouldn’t necessary coordinate, you would see different things at different times. You would be “inside” one of them and not the other, etc.