María Corina Machado has not made any public appearances for almost 40 days. After ambivalent statements about her “clandestinity,” she has been accused of preparing to leave the country. She insists she is in Venezuela but has not given any proof of this. She affirms, as did Edmundo González when he was applying for asylum in Spain, that she will not leave the country.

Isolation and loss of traction
Her appearances have been telematic from closed places. Occasionally, she is seen distraught, despite her efforts to show confidence and forcefulness in arguments.

Their last “national mobilization,” scheduled for September 28, dispensed with the plan of mass gatherings and opted for the tactical resource of the “swarm.” The result was an atomized activity without assistance or relevance. In other words, the organization of opposition mobilization collapsed and demonstrated its weakness.

On social media, where the “queen bee” has ruled by riding on the favors of algorithms, she is increasingly criticized for a promise of “cashing out” (cobrar) that has translated into nothing.

The core of Machado’s political destiny lies precisely in that premise of “cashing out” or making an effective regime change, as she has incessantly promised. The mood changed drastically after Edmundo González fled to Spain through the asylum he requested and communicated to Machado just one day before boarding a plane bound for Madrid.

There has been no institutional breakdown within Venezuela. After various calls from both politicians [Machado and González], no military or police authority has taken up arms, and no preponderant element within the security sphere has mobilized in support of their agenda.

The big private economic actors organized in the main business associations have not actively participated in the postelectoral diatribe. They have made a few statements calling for “peace, stability, and work.” They do not participate in the diatribe and, therefore, have not played an open role in Machado’s insurrectional project.

Recently, the government set up a new space for dialogue with Venezuelan opposition parties. The notable absence was that of the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD) that supported Edmundo González. González, Machado, and the PUD had published a statement in which they indicated that a real dialogue would only be possible if they participated so that Maduro would give up power and begin a “transition.”

The clearly defiant message demands that Chavismo hand over power. Yet, that message resonates differently with the other opposition parties. Machado and González will once again repeat the strategy of abstentionism. They will pressure the parties not to work towards the next elections. They will call them “scorpions” and will try to contain, by force of pressure, further ruptures in the already fragile image of the anti-Chavismo consensus.

Obstacles and opposing forces
What are Machado’s real capabilities to materialize a regime change? With what force is Machado capable of demanding that Maduro begin an imaginary transition?

The leader lacks the basic features that could lead to a coup. If we look at the internal picture, there is no high-impact street mobilization, no support from economic actors, and no institutional breakdown in the military. She also does not have the support of all the opposition, and the “leader” is “in hiding.” That is, internally, there is no possibility of “cashing out” in sight.

The only real options for Venezuela’s extremist opposition are in the hands of factors outside the country.

Outside Venezuela, the US mercenary Erik Prince, together with former Venezuelan military deserters, has raised funds to finance a new private coup. This would not be a novelty given the failed “Operation Gideon” of 2020 by Jordan Goudreau’s contractor, Silvercorp, with support from the DEA.

Now, various leaders of the “Ya Casi Venezuela” platform are accusing each other of fraud and individual profiteering from the funds raised. So far, the funds raised seem to be insufficient for a mercenary mission on a significant scale in a place like Venezuela, which, according to its demographic proportion, is the most militarily equipped country in the region.

It is very difficult to know the actual dimension of the organization belonging to Prince and his associates because the flow of information—false or real—is part of the game in the shadows of intelligence and counterintelligence.

Meanwhile, the governments of the so-called “international community,” or rather, the United States and its allied countries, have taken a position not to recognize the re-election of President Nicolás Maduro. Yet so far, they remain reluctant to accept Edmundo González as “president-elect” in self-exile.

Machado, along with her allies and media operators, have launched a campaign to renew “maximum pressure” on Venezuela’s oil activities.

Venezuela has risen to third place among crude oil exporters to the United States. Meanwhile, military and geopolitical tensions in West Asia create a major obstacle for Washington, limiting its ability to apply more illegal sanctions or revoke OFAC licenses.

License 41-A was automatically extended for another six months without any statements from the US government on the matter.

Clearly, any possibility of calculation to effect a regime change, coup, or assassination in Venezuela lies in the designs and actors of the external front, meaning that these options are not in Machado’s hands.

The leader has probably exhausted all her resources and possibilities internally. Time and all elements of real power are against her.