This is as China’s real estate sector is actively deflating and dragging down GDP growth (real estate as % of GDP estimated to drop from a high of 24% in 2018 to 19% in 2023) on the order of about 1 percentage point annually.
I’m really not sure what you’re talking about? Labour is rotating into clean tech deployments, GDP growth numbers actively account for the deflation of the real estate bubble, manufacturing is still expanding, and estimates for GDP growth from Western analysts continue to shoot up. Meanwhile, bankrupt developers are having their projects be repurposed into public housing.
In fact, investments are rotating rapidly from real estate into industrial capacity, which tends to have higher short-term ROI and a more significant short-term contribution to GDP.
The biggest concern IMO is the rapid expansion of debt at the national level, which reflects the collapse of LGFVs as a viable method of supporting provincial coffers due to the decline in real estate - China’s government is becoming more centralized, and that has the potential to intervene with the (astonishingly successful) hands-off policy that’s been adopted in the past.
2023Q4 - 5.2% GDP growth
2024Q1 - 5.3% GDP growth (+0.7% over estimates)
Caixin Manufacturing PMI - 51.1
Citi GDP growth estimate 2024 - 5% (up from 4.6%)
This is as China’s real estate sector is actively deflating and dragging down GDP growth (real estate as % of GDP estimated to drop from a high of 24% in 2018 to 19% in 2023) on the order of about 1 percentage point annually.
I’m really not sure what you’re talking about? Labour is rotating into clean tech deployments, GDP growth numbers actively account for the deflation of the real estate bubble, manufacturing is still expanding, and estimates for GDP growth from Western analysts continue to shoot up. Meanwhile, bankrupt developers are having their projects be repurposed into public housing.
In fact, investments are rotating rapidly from real estate into industrial capacity, which tends to have higher short-term ROI and a more significant short-term contribution to GDP.
The biggest concern IMO is the rapid expansion of debt at the national level, which reflects the collapse of LGFVs as a viable method of supporting provincial coffers due to the decline in real estate - China’s government is becoming more centralized, and that has the potential to intervene with the (astonishingly successful) hands-off policy that’s been adopted in the past.