It is a matter of weather and material and they did throw enough bombs to hit important targets. It is a game of chance and they did hit the Gestapo office, they hit the rails, they hit factories of the army still in use, hit army garrisons, hit police which enabled deserters to flee in the coming days (at that point the Nazis would draft child soldiers to fight), did effectively destroy anti air capabilities of the Germans, did destroy the strategic command lines, telecommunication and logistical lines for the East, which at that point wasn’t necessary for the Soviets to win, but did actually save lives over there.
If you bomb other nations and try to make civilian population cover and try to instrumentalize attacks on regions that are still war relevant and still enable the Shoa (and even for luck or not did save 70 lives of Shoa victims) are completely legitimate. The German Nazi state used its civilians as shields and also hindered people trying to leave cities.
Talk about the severity and effectiveness is online in nearly all cases is effectively carrying water for Nazis. I know of people who were (as communists) in concentration camps which were happy with the means to further and quicker bring Nazi Germany down. The Nazis did actually start to kill more people in camps to have less people being able to charge them in potential future lawsuits, as Nazis did fear death, prison, revenge and retribution.
After the air attacks the recruitment of Volkssturm members was drastically reduced, too.
Funny, both reports of Western allies, Nazi commanders and Soviet reports do conclude that the bombings of Dresden did cut off the communications, which weakend the Eastern front.
Why do you try to pick single ingredients instead of the full view of the reports? This is stuff I expect from liberal spaces.
proportion of munitions that hit the target =/= whether that target is eventually destroyed.
the first is all i’ve been talking about. the postwar assessments of strategic bombing are critical of that, not in denial of the fact legitimate targets were ever destroyed.
What do you try to say?
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It is a matter of weather and material and they did throw enough bombs to hit important targets. It is a game of chance and they did hit the Gestapo office, they hit the rails, they hit factories of the army still in use, hit army garrisons, hit police which enabled deserters to flee in the coming days (at that point the Nazis would draft child soldiers to fight), did effectively destroy anti air capabilities of the Germans, did destroy the strategic command lines, telecommunication and logistical lines for the East, which at that point wasn’t necessary for the Soviets to win, but did actually save lives over there.
If you bomb other nations and try to make civilian population cover and try to instrumentalize attacks on regions that are still war relevant and still enable the Shoa (and even for luck or not did save 70 lives of Shoa victims) are completely legitimate. The German Nazi state used its civilians as shields and also hindered people trying to leave cities.
Talk about the severity and effectiveness is online in nearly all cases is effectively carrying water for Nazis. I know of people who were (as communists) in concentration camps which were happy with the means to further and quicker bring Nazi Germany down. The Nazis did actually start to kill more people in camps to have less people being able to charge them in potential future lawsuits, as Nazis did fear death, prison, revenge and retribution.
After the air attacks the recruitment of Volkssturm members was drastically reduced, too.
the assessment the allies made of their own air campaign after the war determined strategic bombing was ineffective at destroying specific targets.
Funny, both reports of Western allies, Nazi commanders and Soviet reports do conclude that the bombings of Dresden did cut off the communications, which weakend the Eastern front.
Why do you try to pick single ingredients instead of the full view of the reports? This is stuff I expect from liberal spaces.
proportion of munitions that hit the target =/= whether that target is eventually destroyed.
the first is all i’ve been talking about. the postwar assessments of strategic bombing are critical of that, not in denial of the fact legitimate targets were ever destroyed.