It wasn’t a good idea for Iran back when Iran tried bombing airliners as leverage.
I am even more comfortable saying that it’d be a bad idea for Russia.
Russia could, no doubt, bring down airliners one way or another if it were set on doing so, but:
I think that it’s very questionable that Russia actually benefits from escalation. That will only happen if Russia is (a) being irrational (not impossible, but diplomats can go bang on that), or (b) we’ve dicked up managing the escalation ladder. Russia doesn’t come out on top in pretty much any kind of conflict with NATO, so trying to generate more conflict once Russia hits the “there is a response” threshold, which they are definitely past, seems like a bad idea.
What’s the worst that happens? Maybe a coordinated attack on multiple airliners, kills a few hundred, thousand people, destroys a handful of jets? I mean, sure, that’s bad, but it’s not that big a deal as interstate conflict goes. Like, if Russia wants to attack in some way, that’s a pretty bad way to expend the advantage of surprise.
Maybe the idea could be that an attack couldn’t be firmly attributed to Russia, especially if Russian intelligence tries paying people in country to do something, as was the case IIRC with those arson attacks earlier, but then it’s at least more-difficult for Russia to use that as leverage. Like, trying to make use of the window where you both have plausible deniability so that the other side doesn’t feel like they’re on firm enough ground to act and actually feels confident enough that you were responsible to be affected by using it as leverage seems like a very narrow and dangerous place to act.
If it were a fantastic way to conduct interstate conflict, then this sort of thing would be the norm in interstate conflict, and it isn’t.
As risky and escalatory as it is, I can at least understand using freight airplanes to deliver incendiary packages to shipping warehouses.
I’m not saying I think it’s good, but I can at least piece together the rationale for such actions from Russia.
The same cannot be said for blowing up civilian airliners.
Just from a realpolitik perspective, domestic support for military aid to Ukraine is broadly down across the voting populace in most, if not all, of Ukraine’s biggest ($$$$) partners. Eventually that will likely result in the election of candidates who reflect that view.
Want to know the fastest way to not just immediately reverse that, but have 75%+ of the voting populace support radically escalating Western involvement? Blow up one of their civilian airliners.
Shit, blow up a French airliner and I’d say it would be coin flip whether they deploy active duty military ready for combat operations, in theatre, within a month.
I’m not that worried about this.
It wasn’t a good idea for Iran back when Iran tried bombing airliners as leverage.
I am even more comfortable saying that it’d be a bad idea for Russia.
Russia could, no doubt, bring down airliners one way or another if it were set on doing so, but:
I think that it’s very questionable that Russia actually benefits from escalation. That will only happen if Russia is (a) being irrational (not impossible, but diplomats can go bang on that), or (b) we’ve dicked up managing the escalation ladder. Russia doesn’t come out on top in pretty much any kind of conflict with NATO, so trying to generate more conflict once Russia hits the “there is a response” threshold, which they are definitely past, seems like a bad idea.
What’s the worst that happens? Maybe a coordinated attack on multiple airliners, kills a few hundred, thousand people, destroys a handful of jets? I mean, sure, that’s bad, but it’s not that big a deal as interstate conflict goes. Like, if Russia wants to attack in some way, that’s a pretty bad way to expend the advantage of surprise.
Maybe the idea could be that an attack couldn’t be firmly attributed to Russia, especially if Russian intelligence tries paying people in country to do something, as was the case IIRC with those arson attacks earlier, but then it’s at least more-difficult for Russia to use that as leverage. Like, trying to make use of the window where you both have plausible deniability so that the other side doesn’t feel like they’re on firm enough ground to act and actually feels confident enough that you were responsible to be affected by using it as leverage seems like a very narrow and dangerous place to act.
If it were a fantastic way to conduct interstate conflict, then this sort of thing would be the norm in interstate conflict, and it isn’t.
As risky and escalatory as it is, I can at least understand using freight airplanes to deliver incendiary packages to shipping warehouses.
I’m not saying I think it’s good, but I can at least piece together the rationale for such actions from Russia.
The same cannot be said for blowing up civilian airliners.
Just from a realpolitik perspective, domestic support for military aid to Ukraine is broadly down across the voting populace in most, if not all, of Ukraine’s biggest ($$$$) partners. Eventually that will likely result in the election of candidates who reflect that view.
Want to know the fastest way to not just immediately reverse that, but have 75%+ of the voting populace support radically escalating Western involvement? Blow up one of their civilian airliners.
Shit, blow up a French airliner and I’d say it would be coin flip whether they deploy active duty military ready for combat operations, in theatre, within a month.