Missouri proved they have standing via direct injury:
“At least Missouri has standing to challenge the Secretary’s program. Article III requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in fact—a concrete and imminent harm to a legally protected interest, like property or money—that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by the lawsuit. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561. Here, as the Government concedes, the Secretary’s plan would cost MOHELA, a nonprofit government corporation created by Missouri to participate in the student loan market, an estimated $44 million a year in fees. MOHELA is, by law and function, an instrumentality of Missouri: Labeled an “instrumentality” by the State, it was created by the State, is supervised by the State, and serves a public function. The harm to MOHELA in the performance of its public function is necessarily a direct injury to Missouri itself. The Court reached a similar conclusion 70 years ago in Arkansas v. Texas,
346 U. S. 368.”
Except that MOHELA didn’t sue and didn’t want to sue in the first place. No business has a constitutional right to make a profit. If all debtors transferred their loans to a different company tomorrow, MOHELA would go bankrupt and they’d have just as much standing then, I.e. none at all. Furthermore, as I said, MOHELA didn’t sue, the state of Missouri did. MOHELA doesn’t pay a single cent to the state of Missouri, so exactly how is Missouri being injured here? The fact that MOHELA would make less money changes nothing to the “public function” Missouri is supposed to provide here. It can still continue to offer student loans. So I ask again, where is the injury? None of this gives Missouri the state any standing
Meanwhile, last October, MOHELA admitted in a letter to Rep. Cori Bush (D-MO) that its executives “were not involved with the decision of the Missouri Attorney General’s Office to file for the preliminary injunction in federal court.” The Missouri attorney general had to obtain documents from MOHELA through state sunshine law requests in order to use them in the lawsuit. As I wrote last month, if this is successful, “the Supreme Court would be allowing the plaintiffs to win their case thanks to an unwilling conspirator.”
The internal documents from MOHELA reinforce this. They were obtained through those same state sunshine laws by the Student Borrower Protection Center.
Like 180 million women in America and they all have less rights than my dead body will and they have no standing meanwhile a corporation that didn’t want to go to court was forced to by parts of the government and they have standing for theoretical harm.
“The Court’s first overreach in this case is deciding it at all. Under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must have standing to challenge a government action. And that requires a personal stake—an injury in fact. We do not al-low plaintiffs to bring suit just because they oppose a policy.
Neither do we allow plaintiffs to rely on injuries suffered by others. Those rules may sound technical, but they enforce “fundamental limits on federal judicial power.” Allen v.
Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 750 (1984). They keep courts acting like courts. Or stated the other way around, they prevent courts from acting like this Court does today. The plaintiffs in this case are six States that have no personal stake in the Secretary’s loan forgiveness plan. They are classic ide-ological plaintiffs: They think the plan a very bad idea, but they are no worse off because the Secretary differs. In giv-ing those States a forum—in adjudicating their complaint— the Court forgets its proper role. The Court acts as though it is an arbiter of political and policy disputes, rather than of cases and controversies.”
They claimed they had standing. All the liberal justices disagree. This was a partisan lawsuit from the beginning and conservative activist judges on the SCOTUS are legislating from the bench with this ruling and ignoring decades of standing precedent.
Missouri proved they have standing via direct injury:
“At least Missouri has standing to challenge the Secretary’s program. Article III requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in fact—a concrete and imminent harm to a legally protected interest, like property or money—that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by the lawsuit. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561. Here, as the Government concedes, the Secretary’s plan would cost MOHELA, a nonprofit government corporation created by Missouri to participate in the student loan market, an estimated $44 million a year in fees. MOHELA is, by law and function, an instrumentality of Missouri: Labeled an “instrumentality” by the State, it was created by the State, is supervised by the State, and serves a public function. The harm to MOHELA in the performance of its public function is necessarily a direct injury to Missouri itself. The Court reached a similar conclusion 70 years ago in Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U. S. 368.”
Except that MOHELA didn’t sue and didn’t want to sue in the first place. No business has a constitutional right to make a profit. If all debtors transferred their loans to a different company tomorrow, MOHELA would go bankrupt and they’d have just as much standing then, I.e. none at all. Furthermore, as I said, MOHELA didn’t sue, the state of Missouri did. MOHELA doesn’t pay a single cent to the state of Missouri, so exactly how is Missouri being injured here? The fact that MOHELA would make less money changes nothing to the “public function” Missouri is supposed to provide here. It can still continue to offer student loans. So I ask again, where is the injury? None of this gives Missouri the state any standing
Ah yes, red states, famous defenders of public institutions. Good grief. Thanks for clarifying!
Missouri proved no such thing.
https://prospect.org/justice/2023-06-19-student-loan-cancellation-supreme-court-mohela/
Like 180 million women in America and they all have less rights than my dead body will and they have no standing meanwhile a corporation that didn’t want to go to court was forced to by parts of the government and they have standing for theoretical harm.
“The Court’s first overreach in this case is deciding it at all. Under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must have standing to challenge a government action. And that requires a personal stake—an injury in fact. We do not al-low plaintiffs to bring suit just because they oppose a policy.
Neither do we allow plaintiffs to rely on injuries suffered by others. Those rules may sound technical, but they enforce “fundamental limits on federal judicial power.” Allen v.
Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 750 (1984). They keep courts acting like courts. Or stated the other way around, they prevent courts from acting like this Court does today. The plaintiffs in this case are six States that have no personal stake in the Secretary’s loan forgiveness plan. They are classic ide-ological plaintiffs: They think the plan a very bad idea, but they are no worse off because the Secretary differs. In giv-ing those States a forum—in adjudicating their complaint— the Court forgets its proper role. The Court acts as though it is an arbiter of political and policy disputes, rather than of cases and controversies.”
They claimed they had standing. All the liberal justices disagree. This was a partisan lawsuit from the beginning and conservative activist judges on the SCOTUS are legislating from the bench with this ruling and ignoring decades of standing precedent.