Amusingly enough, I would tend to think that the desire to ascribe belief in conspiracy theories to some specific and limited set of nominal causes is actually an example of the same sort of thinking that leads to belief in conspiracy theories in the first place. It’s trying to stuff some inherently very complex and nuanced dynamic into a simple, one-size-fits-all box.
But the study, apparently, did not fall into that trap: “I was surprised by the fact that about 90% of the variables assessed significantly predicted conspiracy belief (of 52 variables). These results point to conspiracy belief being even more psychologically complex than I initially presumed,” Bowes told PsyPost.
Exactly what is being said there is that the researchers did fall into just the trap I’m talking about, then were “surprised” when the study demonstrated that the matter was more complex and nuanced than they expected.
What makes you think that’s the cause of belief in conspiracy teorie? From the study: “Three domains were the strongest predictors of conspiracy belief: tendencies to have odd beliefs and experiences, perceive threat and danger, and be antagonistic or feel that you are superior to others."
Where on earth did you get the idea that I’m trying to ascribe conspiracy theory belief to any specific cause, much less a single one? That’s the exact dynamic I’m criticizing.
I got it from your comment. In the study, they were interested in many possible causes. They were surprised that almost all of them played a big role. They might have expected half to be meaningless. No-one was expecting a single cause. But expecting a single cause would still not make them prone to conspiracy. Some things do have a single cause.
Amusingly enough, I would tend to think that the desire to ascribe belief in conspiracy theories to some specific and limited set of nominal causes is actually an example of the same sort of thinking that leads to belief in conspiracy theories in the first place. It’s trying to stuff some inherently very complex and nuanced dynamic into a simple, one-size-fits-all box.
But the study, apparently, did not fall into that trap: “I was surprised by the fact that about 90% of the variables assessed significantly predicted conspiracy belief (of 52 variables). These results point to conspiracy belief being even more psychologically complex than I initially presumed,” Bowes told PsyPost.
That quote actually supports my point.
Exactly what is being said there is that the researchers did fall into just the trap I’m talking about, then were “surprised” when the study demonstrated that the matter was more complex and nuanced than they expected.
What makes you think that’s the cause of belief in conspiracy teorie? From the study: “Three domains were the strongest predictors of conspiracy belief: tendencies to have odd beliefs and experiences, perceive threat and danger, and be antagonistic or feel that you are superior to others."
What?
Where on earth did you get the idea that I’m trying to ascribe conspiracy theory belief to any specific cause, much less a single one? That’s the exact dynamic I’m criticizing.
I got it from your comment. In the study, they were interested in many possible causes. They were surprised that almost all of them played a big role. They might have expected half to be meaningless. No-one was expecting a single cause. But expecting a single cause would still not make them prone to conspiracy. Some things do have a single cause.