Does cost of manufacture matter to them? The Abrams is roughly double the cost of a T-90 and the US has bought and built so many of them the army asked congress to stop (and congress said no).
The US army also has a fuck ton of bridge layers attached to their armoured divisions.
Us tank doctrine isn’t developed around extended periods of independent operation, so while maintenance is an issue of expense, it’s not one of performance.
That the doctrine isn’t built around extended periods is actually a problem in the era of combined arms. Not everyone is going to roll over like desert storm.
That the doctrine isn’t built around extended periods is actually a problem
what? no country is capable of keeping their troops ahead of their supplies for very long, it’d be bad doctrine to assume you could make up for that with airlifts
when has attrition warfare been about whose troops can operate unsupported for longer? who has more material & men, and the rate at which they are replaced is what ‘attrition’ analyzes
Sorry, what I’m saying is that tanks are less able to engage in attrition if they are constantly requiring a lot of constant work on them and guzzle more fuel as they move, including as they move from engagement to maintenance and back and forth. And requiring bridge layers and such makes logistics harder, further limiting the use of the vehicles.
reading it back you’re correct, operating for over 12 hours without support would be something desirable in a tank, especially in maneuver. just because the US usually has enough support doesn’t mean it couldn’t be a serious liability if they get into situations support isn’t forthcoming
even other than bridges heavy tanks have to be much more selective when planning routes, light armored cars and smaller tanks can more or less go in a straight line where heavy vehicles have to avoid certain types of terrain (slopes, mud, narrow passes, etc.) to a greater degree, and take a longer, more circuitous route.
the T-80,90, etc. have less vertical cannon traversal than the abrams as well, this is due to differences in combat doctrine: america/the west expected a defensive war in the cold war times, while russia expected to be on the offense. therefore western vehicles are large, heavy, reliant on stable and secure logistics situations, and designed to fight often from prepared defensive positions, with long range weapon systems and optics to use them accurately, whereas russian vehicles are smaller, cheaper, lighter, more mobile, easier to maintain, with shorter range but versatile weapons (one of the T-series of tanks can launch AT missiles out of its smoothbore cannon IIRC), because they expected to be on the move and their combat doctrine emphasized closing with the enemy to negate optics/range/sensors advantages, they built tanks to be able to use railway cars and roads and maneuver more easily in tight terrain to attack from unexpected directions and outmaneuver defenses.
Does cost of manufacture matter to them? The Abrams is roughly double the cost of a T-90 and the US has bought and built so many of them the army asked congress to stop (and congress said no).
The US army also has a fuck ton of bridge layers attached to their armoured divisions.
Us tank doctrine isn’t developed around extended periods of independent operation, so while maintenance is an issue of expense, it’s not one of performance.
That the doctrine isn’t built around extended periods is actually a problem in the era of combined arms. Not everyone is going to roll over like desert storm.
what? no country is capable of keeping their troops ahead of their supplies for very long, it’d be bad doctrine to assume you could make up for that with airlifts
Their doctrine only works if things stay maneuver warfare, and not attrition based, is what I’m saying.
when has attrition warfare been about whose troops can operate unsupported for longer? who has more material & men, and the rate at which they are replaced is what ‘attrition’ analyzes
Sorry, what I’m saying is that tanks are less able to engage in attrition if they are constantly requiring a lot of constant work on them and guzzle more fuel as they move, including as they move from engagement to maintenance and back and forth. And requiring bridge layers and such makes logistics harder, further limiting the use of the vehicles.
reading it back you’re correct, operating for over 12 hours without support would be something desirable in a tank, especially in maneuver. just because the US usually has enough support doesn’t mean it couldn’t be a serious liability if they get into situations support isn’t forthcoming
even other than bridges heavy tanks have to be much more selective when planning routes, light armored cars and smaller tanks can more or less go in a straight line where heavy vehicles have to avoid certain types of terrain (slopes, mud, narrow passes, etc.) to a greater degree, and take a longer, more circuitous route.
the T-80,90, etc. have less vertical cannon traversal than the abrams as well, this is due to differences in combat doctrine: america/the west expected a defensive war in the cold war times, while russia expected to be on the offense. therefore western vehicles are large, heavy, reliant on stable and secure logistics situations, and designed to fight often from prepared defensive positions, with long range weapon systems and optics to use them accurately, whereas russian vehicles are smaller, cheaper, lighter, more mobile, easier to maintain, with shorter range but versatile weapons (one of the T-series of tanks can launch AT missiles out of its smoothbore cannon IIRC), because they expected to be on the move and their combat doctrine emphasized closing with the enemy to negate optics/range/sensors advantages, they built tanks to be able to use railway cars and roads and maneuver more easily in tight terrain to attack from unexpected directions and outmaneuver defenses.