The data [from Pew] suggests that the progressive vision of winning a presidential election simply by mobilizing strong support from Democratic constituencies simply did not materialize for Mr. Biden.
Wtf did I just read? The idea is to mobilize strong support from Democratic constituencies by running a progressive candidate who supports progressive causes. Obviously, if you run a right-winger like Biden, he’ll draw more support from the right and fail to mobilize the left. Are they trying to pretend that Biden was a progressive or something? What an incredible take.
That’s a totally fair response to the argument they’re presenting, and no doubt they’re framing it that way because they’re looking out from inside the corporate media establishment, but think of the way the Democratic Party sees it. From their perspective, there’s still scant evidence that progressive voter mobilization (vis a vis a progressive candidate) will overwhelm the downside of conservative voter mobilization in the other direction and against a progressive candidate. For that evidence they’d need to look to Congressional downballot races which are more fluid and open to experimentation. The evidence of progressive voter mobilization doesn’t show up there either. So while your argument makes intuitive sense, from a strategic perspective there are still significant risks if it doesn’t pan out the way you’re proposing.
For that evidence they’d need to look to Congressional downballot races which are more fluid and open to experimentation. The evidence of progressive voter mobilization doesn’t show up there either.
I disagree. This is from the 2020 election:
Funny enough, the two Florida democrats who lost in blue districts also specifically distanced themselves from a ballot measure to raise the minimum wage on the basis that it was too progressive - both they and Biden lost in Florida while the ballot measure passed.
Progressive policies are broadly popular. Running on things that are popular tend to get you more votes. People like it when you do stuff for them.
The only evidence I’ve seen to the contrary is a NYT opinion piece that cites centrist think tanks and random people’s opinions. I didn’t see anything in there that looked reliable or compelling.
So I don’t necessarily disagree with your chart, but it’s neither statistically relevant nor comprehensive enough to draw any kind of firm conclusion. It’s really just a grossly oversimplified snapshot that includes people from all over the country, and it doesn’t correct for any other confounding variables. The source I linked in my first comment is much more comprehensive.
Progressive policies are broadly popular. Running on things that are popular tend to get you more votes. People like it when you do stuff for them.
Yes, I get that from an intuitive sense and based on scattershot polling. It’s a great sound byte, but it’s just a sound byte. You’ve not provided evidence of any of those propositions, and per my original response to you, the party is looking for electoral evidence, not intuitive suppositions.
The only evidence I’ve seen to the contrary is a NYT opinion piece that cites centrist think tanks and random people’s opinions. I didn’t see anything in there that looked reliable or compelling.
No offense, but the only “evidence” you’ve provided to support your assertion is a jpeg with 16 names on it, so I find your retort conveniently dismissive. They’re not “random people”, some of them are academics, and many of them are actual progressives. But fine, if you prefer that I be held to a higher evidentiary standard than you are, here’s what I can cobble together:
And this source goes into a great amount of detail to address the “progressive paradox” that you’re highlighting, whereby progressive policies are ostensibly popular but progressive politicians less so. It suggests that how you frame progressive policies matters a lot to whether or not it’ll reach a receptive audience.
So yes, based on the evidence I can find the popularity of progressive policies does not translate into progressive victories. The Party is interested in electoral success, and if progressive politicians repeatedly fail to mobilize enough turnout to win elections except in the most ideologically pure districts, the Party is going to consistently hedge toward moderation on a national stage.
Thank you for filtering out the irrelevant information and editorializing in the opinion piece.
I’ll concede that there is some evidence to support your position, but I would still argue against it. Much of the data used in these studies comes from a different political landscape than what we’re dealing with today. There are many studies that show increasing political polarization over time, and I would argue that that reduces the fluidity of voter choices. Republican voters now are less likely to vote for a Democrat now than they were in the 90’s, when, for example, Bill Clinton won Louisiana and Tennessee. I would also point out that this conventional wisdom failed to account for Trump’s 2016 victory and the fact that the Republican party remains strong despite becoming increasingly extremist.
I don’t have time to read through all of your studies but I did read through the first. Something I found notable, which I expected, was that while the study found that extremism was correlated with general election losses in both parties, the effect was significantly more pronounced in the Republican party. This makes the successful rise of right-wing extremism even less coherent with your point of view. But from my perspective, it makes perfect sense - in the current polarized environment, mobilizing one’s own base is more effective than appealing to the center, so much so that even if you’re promoting broadly unpopular policies, it can still win against someone who has failed to adapt.
Again, you’re intuitively correct. I actually agree with what you’re saying, and I acknowledge that the current landscape is changing the fundamentals in a way that we can’t fully understand just yet. But from an institutional perspective, there’s going to be a bias against unproven strategies until evidence emerges that the risk of backfire is low. It’s more “the devil you know” and all that. The testing ground for the electoral effectiveness of progressive voter mobilization is downballot. Until consistent signs of success emerge in downballot races, the Party is simply not going to take a risk on the national stage. And I’d counter that if downballot success isn’t happening, then there’s something underneath your argument that might be missing. If there’s some kind of underlying fundamental that’s missing from the puzzle, it might be phrased like this (I’m reworking your last point):
In the current polarized environment, mobilizing one’s own base isshould be more effective than appealing to the center, so much so that even if you’re promoting broadly unpopular policies, it can still win against someone who has failed to adapt. But young and progressive voter turnout is consistently low enough that this positive effect is dampened.
I’ll admit it’s a chicken-and-egg argument, in that you can’t test progressive mobilization without first putting forward a progressive candidate, which isn’t going to happen until progressive voters mobilize, and so on. But I think the Party’s major, overwhelming fear is that progressive voters won’t show up even if you give them what they want, and then the electoral damage would be overwhelming. To put a bit of punctuation on it, my state (North Carolina) has a persistent Republican supermajority in the Legislature which many locals are tying directly to the leftward shift of the party at the national level. The more leftward the Democratic Party goes on social/cultural issues, the redder North Carolina gets, especially in the past few years. We had a Democratic trifecta as recently as 2010 and they’ve so thoroughly baked in Republican control that I don’t anticipate Democrats taking control of either house (or the judiciary) through the end of my life, which is crippling for centrists and progressives of all stripes.
Wtf did I just read? The idea is to mobilize strong support from Democratic constituencies by running a progressive candidate who supports progressive causes. Obviously, if you run a right-winger like Biden, he’ll draw more support from the right and fail to mobilize the left. Are they trying to pretend that Biden was a progressive or something? What an incredible take.
That’s a totally fair response to the argument they’re presenting, and no doubt they’re framing it that way because they’re looking out from inside the corporate media establishment, but think of the way the Democratic Party sees it. From their perspective, there’s still scant evidence that progressive voter mobilization (vis a vis a progressive candidate) will overwhelm the downside of conservative voter mobilization in the other direction and against a progressive candidate. For that evidence they’d need to look to Congressional downballot races which are more fluid and open to experimentation. The evidence of progressive voter mobilization doesn’t show up there either. So while your argument makes intuitive sense, from a strategic perspective there are still significant risks if it doesn’t pan out the way you’re proposing.
I disagree. This is from the 2020 election:
Funny enough, the two Florida democrats who lost in blue districts also specifically distanced themselves from a ballot measure to raise the minimum wage on the basis that it was too progressive - both they and Biden lost in Florida while the ballot measure passed.
Progressive policies are broadly popular. Running on things that are popular tend to get you more votes. People like it when you do stuff for them.
The only evidence I’ve seen to the contrary is a NYT opinion piece that cites centrist think tanks and random people’s opinions. I didn’t see anything in there that looked reliable or compelling.
So I don’t necessarily disagree with your chart, but it’s neither statistically relevant nor comprehensive enough to draw any kind of firm conclusion. It’s really just a grossly oversimplified snapshot that includes people from all over the country, and it doesn’t correct for any other confounding variables. The source I linked in my first comment is much more comprehensive.
Yes, I get that from an intuitive sense and based on scattershot polling. It’s a great sound byte, but it’s just a sound byte. You’ve not provided evidence of any of those propositions, and per my original response to you, the party is looking for electoral evidence, not intuitive suppositions.
No offense, but the only “evidence” you’ve provided to support your assertion is a jpeg with 16 names on it, so I find your retort conveniently dismissive. They’re not “random people”, some of them are academics, and many of them are actual progressives. But fine, if you prefer that I be held to a higher evidentiary standard than you are, here’s what I can cobble together:
And this source goes into a great amount of detail to address the “progressive paradox” that you’re highlighting, whereby progressive policies are ostensibly popular but progressive politicians less so. It suggests that how you frame progressive policies matters a lot to whether or not it’ll reach a receptive audience.
So yes, based on the evidence I can find the popularity of progressive policies does not translate into progressive victories. The Party is interested in electoral success, and if progressive politicians repeatedly fail to mobilize enough turnout to win elections except in the most ideologically pure districts, the Party is going to consistently hedge toward moderation on a national stage.
Thank you for filtering out the irrelevant information and editorializing in the opinion piece.
I’ll concede that there is some evidence to support your position, but I would still argue against it. Much of the data used in these studies comes from a different political landscape than what we’re dealing with today. There are many studies that show increasing political polarization over time, and I would argue that that reduces the fluidity of voter choices. Republican voters now are less likely to vote for a Democrat now than they were in the 90’s, when, for example, Bill Clinton won Louisiana and Tennessee. I would also point out that this conventional wisdom failed to account for Trump’s 2016 victory and the fact that the Republican party remains strong despite becoming increasingly extremist.
I don’t have time to read through all of your studies but I did read through the first. Something I found notable, which I expected, was that while the study found that extremism was correlated with general election losses in both parties, the effect was significantly more pronounced in the Republican party. This makes the successful rise of right-wing extremism even less coherent with your point of view. But from my perspective, it makes perfect sense - in the current polarized environment, mobilizing one’s own base is more effective than appealing to the center, so much so that even if you’re promoting broadly unpopular policies, it can still win against someone who has failed to adapt.
Again, you’re intuitively correct. I actually agree with what you’re saying, and I acknowledge that the current landscape is changing the fundamentals in a way that we can’t fully understand just yet. But from an institutional perspective, there’s going to be a bias against unproven strategies until evidence emerges that the risk of backfire is low. It’s more “the devil you know” and all that. The testing ground for the electoral effectiveness of progressive voter mobilization is downballot. Until consistent signs of success emerge in downballot races, the Party is simply not going to take a risk on the national stage. And I’d counter that if downballot success isn’t happening, then there’s something underneath your argument that might be missing. If there’s some kind of underlying fundamental that’s missing from the puzzle, it might be phrased like this (I’m reworking your last point):
I’ll admit it’s a chicken-and-egg argument, in that you can’t test progressive mobilization without first putting forward a progressive candidate, which isn’t going to happen until progressive voters mobilize, and so on. But I think the Party’s major, overwhelming fear is that progressive voters won’t show up even if you give them what they want, and then the electoral damage would be overwhelming. To put a bit of punctuation on it, my state (North Carolina) has a persistent Republican supermajority in the Legislature which many locals are tying directly to the leftward shift of the party at the national level. The more leftward the Democratic Party goes on social/cultural issues, the redder North Carolina gets, especially in the past few years. We had a Democratic trifecta as recently as 2010 and they’ve so thoroughly baked in Republican control that I don’t anticipate Democrats taking control of either house (or the judiciary) through the end of my life, which is crippling for centrists and progressives of all stripes.