It must be said that the decision taken by Beijing to impose new targeted sanctions against the Americans worsened the already tense atmosphere of the dialog on the eve of the arrival of Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman in Tianjin.

We are talking about the restrictions adopted by Beijing at the end of July on the basis of the national Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law against six American individuals and one organization. It was a response to the collective warning about the risks of doing business announced by a number of US government agencies on July 16 in Hong Kong and to the financial restrictions on the seven heads of the Central People’s Government of the PRC in autonomy. In response to such situation the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized Washington and lodged a strong protest. Once again, the Chinese Foreign Ministry qualified the actions of the USA as a serious violation of international law and flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the country. In respect of the specific surnames, ‘stop list’ includes former U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Louis Ross, Chairman of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission Carolyn Bartholomew, former staff director of Congressional-Executive Commission on China Jonathan Stivers, DoYun Kim at National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, representative of the International Republican Institute Adam Joseph King, China director at Human Rights Watch Sophie Richardson, and the Hong Kong Democratic Council.

Minor detail: Beijing took the decision to impose snapback sanctions on the eve of the arrival of Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman to China on July 25-26. Many experts believe that in this way Beijing reminded the US of the collective sanctions of Western countries on the situation around Xinjiang that were painfully perceived here.

Chinese political scientists emphasize with some complacency that through these measures a clear signal is sent to the US about Beijing’s readiness to respond harshly according to the principle ‘an eye for an eye’. The Chinese are not ready to back down on their principles for normalization of a bilateral dialogue and apparently at this stage aren’t inclined to consider the negotiations in Tianjin as a prologue to the expected summit of the leaders of China and the United States.

Many political actors remind that the revision of the White House’s policy toward China has been rather prolonged. And although in general its confrontational nature is already obvious the Chinese are trying to find the balance chosen by Joe Biden’s administration between the elements of cooperation and rivalry starting from which they could make further decisions on the American vector. It must be said that China traditionally accuses the US of growing tensions in absentee polemics. Beijing’s targeted sanctions call to consider as a logical continuation of similar steps taken earlier against members of the Donald Trump team: on January 20, 28 former officials of the Republican administration were added to the restrictive list and on 10 December 2020 ‘for Hong Kong’ representatives of the US executive branch, Congress and a number of American NGO representatives were also included in the restrictive list.

The practical meaning of restrictions on former White House employees in China is explained by the desire to limit large overseas corporations, many of which work closely with Chinese market, the employment opportunities to senior posts of the most ardent Sinophobes among influential retirees. And in this sense, as it’s believed here, unilateral targeted sanctions are much more effective at hitting the Americans whose dependence on trade and investment cooperation with China continues to grow even despite all the talk about economic decoupling from each other. Chinese officials put under Washington’s sanctions do not have any business connections with the United States since they are deprived of the right to engage in commercial activities while holding public office at a certain level.

A rather interesting pattern is emerging: the interests of local functionaries who fall under the influence of the American restrictions do not actually suffer but Beijing’s response is painful for the Americans primarily from a financial point of view.

  • @nutomicA
    link
    43 years ago

    Could you please include a link to the source?